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Abstract 
This study is dedicated to the investigation of interaction of conscious and unconscious processes in artificial grammar 
learning. The main problem: how the conflict between two implicitly learned regularities contained in stimuli influences 
classification of them. The results of the experiment suggest that subjects implicitly learned not only the rules of artificial 
grammar, but also the hidden hint (a small font lengthiness). In the case of contradiction between the rules of grammar and the 
hidden hint subjects switched their strategy of task performance to an analytical one, being unaware of this contradiction. It 
 the level of This result 
suggests that a collision with stimuli that provoke conflict between implicitly acquired knowledge enhances the conscious 
control over the task performance. 
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Russian Psychological Society. 
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1. Introduction 
Implicit learning is a widely known phenomenon in cognitive psychology: it is a process of unintentional 
knowledge acquisition without the ability to express it explicitly and verbalize it [1]. Firstly implicit learning was 
found in the task of artificial grammar learning (AGL) and then in a range of other tasks (see [2] for a review). 
Further experiments showed that in AGL subjects use both the implicit knowledge and the explicit recollection of 
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grammatical strings or their fragments [3]. The important issue of today studies is how implicit and explicit 
knowledge interact with each other while subject makes a decision and which of them has a priority. 
Reber suggested two system approach postulating the existence of two independent cognitive blocks: 
consciousness and evolutionary older cognitive unconscious [1]. According to Reber, unconscious processing 
goes independently of consciousness, in its base lay older brain structures and it is more resistant to different 
traumas and deceases. P. Lewicki and colleagues claimed that consciousness has in principle no access to the 
results of cognitive unconscious' work [4]. However, some data appeared indicating that the increasing conscious 
control can impair the implicit learning results [5], [6]. 
In Reber and Allen's AGL experiments [5] subjects performed the string classification worse when they were 
informed about the existence of the grammar rules on the learning phase. In other words, when the informed 
subjects started to perform an explicit search of the grammar rules, their learning efficiency decreased. Moreover, 
it appeared that the implicit learning effect wasn't always manifested in replication studies. Lewicki himself and a 
range of other researchers started to discuss such a factor of learning process as subject's strategy [7], [8]. 
On the other hand, free verbal reports have been questioned to be an adequate measure of awareness of the 
knowledge acquired in learning (e.g. see [9]). Some objective and subjective measures were suggested as 
alternative, including subjects' confidence ratings [10]. The use of the new awareness measures led to more a 
differentiated classification of subjective experience of people (e.g. [11]). Summarizing experimental results we 
can say that subjects can form the following levels (or types) of knowledge while learning:  
- unconscious knowledge that affects behavior in the task while subject thinks that he or she gives random 
answers; 
- implicit knowledge followed by increasing confidence (intuition or meta-knowledge), that is the subject is 
aware that he or she knows something but can't say what exactly; 
- explicit knowledge that can be verbalized. 
On the way from the first level of knowledge to the second one, perhaps the emotions and some somatic 
processes take place, that are signals to consciousness about the existence of some knowledge in the unconscious 
sphere [12]. But people do not always accept these signals, it can be manifested by switching the intuitive 
strategy of decision making to the analytical one [8]. 
So we can suppose that there are several processes presented while learning. With trial repetition cognitive 
unconscious stores the upcoming information about frequencies and co-occurrences of different stimuli and parts 
of them: in brief, it learns the regularities presented in the material. New stimuli are compared with the 
unconscious "expectations" and the result of this comparison is followed by an emotional signal intended for 
consciousness. At the same time consciousness learns to track these signals and to discriminate the states of 
unconscious forming second order knowledge. But how does the explicit knowledge appear if consciousness has 
no direct access to the content of the unconscious representations? The answer to this question was suggested by 
the concept of mechanism of awareness developed by V. Allakhverdov [13]. According to the principle of 
independent verification, getting emotional signals about the states of unconscious, consciousness starts to make 
hypotheses about the causes of these states and tests them driving ones behavior. When consciousness switches to 
sequential testing of explicit hypotheses it can impair task performance, if these hypotheses are false.  
According to Allakhverdov's approach (that we share), consciousness is first of all needed when upcoming 
information is uncertain, contradictory or ambiguous. In that case, unconscious can't choose one of the possible 
alternatives, and there is someone needed who can make a decision, based on nonempirical information or, in a 
pinch, who can "flip a coin". If so, insertion of some contradictive stimuli into the task should increase subjects' 
conscious control over the task performance, that is they should switch to analytical strategy increasing the role 
of explicit knowledge in the decision making process. This assumption was tested in the experiment. 
1. Experiment 
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1.1. Method 
For the experimental investigation of the influence of contradiction in implicit learning on the level of 
conscious control over the task performance we used AGL paradigm. 
1.1.1. Participants 
One hundred and thirteen students (37 male, 76 female) participated the study. An age range is from 18 to 25 
years (M = 21, SD = 1.6).  
1.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
Special computer program was created to present stimuli and record answers. The experiment was run on 
Pentium-compatible PCs. The display had a white background. Stimuli (strings of Latin letters) appeared in the 
center of the display. Font: Arial Black; font size: 36; letters' colour: green and blue. The Brooks and Vokey's 
grammar [14] was taken as a basis of our grammar. Stimuli were different because of in our experiment there 
were more groups of subjects. 
1.1.3. Procedure 
Subjects were asked to take part in experiment aimed to study memory. The experiment consisted of two 
phases: learning and test. On the learning phase subjects were sequentially presented with 32 strings in random 
order: 16 grammatical and 16 ungrammatical, for 4 seconds each. Half of the strings were colored blue, and 
another half  green. Subjects were instructed to memorize green strings and ignore blue. 
On the test phase 32 new strings were sequentially presented in random order: 16 grammatical and 16 
ungrammatical. All the strings were black. Before test phase subjects were informed that green strings on the 
learning phase were composed on the basis of complex set of rules (artificial grammar). Then they were told that 
they will be presented with new strings and they should classify strings as based on set of rules (grammatical) or 
random (ungrammatical). Each string was presented for 3 seconds and then disappeared. Subjects were asked to 
response by presenting arrow keys: "left"  if he or she decided that string was grammatical or "right"  if he or 
she decided that string was a random letter sample.  
All subjects were divided in four randomized groups: two control (C1 and C2) and two experimental (E1 and 
E2). On the learning phase in E1 and E2 all grammatical strings were green and all ungrammatical  blue. In 
addition one implicit regularity was introduced: all grammatical strings were graphically stretched wide by 115%. 
On the test phase in E1 all grammatical strings were also stretched the same way, but in E2 the contradiction was 
created: half of grammatical and half of ungrammatical strings were stretched.  
Two control groups were used to test the ability of subjects to learn implicitly two introduced regularities 
(artificial grammar and lengthiness). C1-subjects learned only grammar: on learning phase all green strings was 
grammatical, but in both learning and test phases grammaticality and lengthiness did not correlate. C2-subjects 
learned only lengthiness. On both phases grammaticality and lengthiness also did not correlate: on the learning 
phase stretched strings were green, and on the test phase correct answer was the choice of stretched strings.  
After test phase each subject completed a questionnaire, in which he or she answered if he or she noticed the 
differences in lengthiness and whether it helped to perform a classification. 
1.2. Results 
1.2.1. Learning 
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Learning was analyzed in all groups by comparison of mean percent of correctly classified strings with control 
level (table 1). 
 
Table 1. Classification performance in groups C1, E1 and E2 (learning of grammar) 
Group Mean (percent of correct answers) SD 
C1 60.45 10.35 
E1 60.61 10.18 
E2 61.77 10.16 
C2 (control) 54.40 10.32 
 
In AGL experiments there is usually control group, learning random stimuli. In present study we used C2-data 
to compute the control level. C2-participants learned only lengthiness, grammaticality was irrelevant, so we used 
the proportion of grammatical strings (54.4%) in the set of strings chosen by C2-participants as a control level for 
grammar learning assessment.  
To compare percentage of correctly classified grammar strings we used one-sample t-test. All three groups 
(C1, E1, E2) correctly classified strings significantly more often than 54,4% (C1: t = 4.018; p < 0.001, E1: t = 
4.391,  p < 0.001; E2: t = 4.952, p < 0.001). We can conclude that subjects in these groups successfully learned to 
classify strings on the basis of artificial grammar with the rules of which they were generated. Subjects in groups 
C1, E1 and E2 classified strings with just about similar level of correctness. Classification efficiency did not 
differ significantly (ANOVA, F = 0.211, p = 0.811).  
To assess learning in C2, which subjects learned only lengthiness on the learning phase, we computed the 
percentage of stretched strings, that had been chosen as grammatical on the test phase (C2-subjects had the same 
instruction: classify strings as grammatical or not). The control level was the percentage of stretched strings that 
had been chosen as grammatical in C1, where lengthiness was irrelevant. C2-subjects chosen stretched strings as 
grammatical in 55.21% of all cases, and it was significantly higher than control 47.23% (t = 3.755 p < 0.001). So, 
learning also occurred in C2: subjects learned to discriminate 115%-lengthiness and chose stretched strings on 
the test phase.  
1.2.2. Participants' strategies 
Signal detection theory was used to analyze strategic data. Classification process was taken as a detection of 
grammatical strings (stretched  for C2) in the case of noise (the absence of reliable knowledge about 
classification basis). For all the subjects  string is in fact grammatical) and 
 subjective requirements for stimulus 
to be viewed as signal. In our cas - classification strings as 
grammatical (yesrate). These parameters were calculated for three groups (table 2).  
Table 2. Hits, false alarms and yesrate in C1, E1 and E2 
Group Hits False alarms Yesrate 
C1 0.59 0.38 0.48 
E1 0.61 0.40* 0.50* 
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E2 0.56 0.32* 0.45* 
 
ANOVA was used for comparison of groups E1 and E2. There was no significant difference in a hit-level (F = 
1,551, p = 0.218). But it was in false alarm level: it was higher in E2 (F = 4.062, p < 0.05). The yesrate was 
significantly higher in E1 (F = 5.649, p < 0.05).  
1.2.3. Reaction times 
The groups did not differ in average response time (ANOVA, F = 0.634, p = 0.595). No significant differences 
were found in RTs in hit (F = 1.755, p = 0. 755) or false alarm trials (F = 1.755, p = 0.160). 
We also analyzed the decrease of RTs from the beginning to the end of test phase. We ignored first 5 trials, 
considering the process of task adaptation (in the analysis of RTs it can be particularly important). Trials from 6 
to 32 we divided in three equal stages of 9 trials. We compared the change of mean RT from first to third stage in 
different groups. 
E2-subjects did not show significant differences in RTs on going from the first stage (2290 ms) to the third 
(2120 ms) (F = 0.678, p = 0.508). RT in C1 decreased from 2710 ms in the first stage to 2380 ms in the third 
stage at the level of trend (F = 2.753, p = 0.064). RT's dispersions differ significantly on three stages in E1 (F = 
4.799, p = 0.008), so nonparametric Kruskal-Wallace test was used. According to this test, subjects' RTs 
decreased significantly from  2430 ms in the first stage to 1770 ms  in the third (chi-square = 25.455, df = 2, p 
<0.001,). 
1.2.4. Interview 
According to the after experiment interview the portion of the subjects noticed that some strings were 
stretched (28% in C1, 48% in C2, 31% in E1 and 22% in E2). C2 and E2 differed at the level of tendency: more 
of C2-subjects noticed that some strings were stretched (chi-square = 3.429, p < 0.1). There were no significant 
differences between the other groups. Nobody grasped the connection between strings' lengthiness and 
classification. So we conclude that the subjects perceived lengthiness, but assessed it as an irrelevant feature.  
2. Discussion 
There were learning of both hidden patterns laid out in the stimulus material: grammar (groups C1, E1 and E2) 
and lengthiness (in the group C2). Learning of grammar was equally effective in all three groups of subjects. The 
after experiment interview suggests that learning of these features was largely unconscious.  
We proved our hypothesis about the impact of contradiction on decision making strategy in the task of string 
classification as grammatical or not: E2-subjects acted more carefully and used more stringent criterion of 
decision making than E1-subjects. It was demonstrated by a 
RT in classification task in contrast to E1-subjects, who decreased RT from the beginning to the end of the phase. 
We interpret this data as a strategy change. The analytical strategy differs from the intuitive one (holistic) by the 
choice of decision basis. For the holistic strategy it is a general impression of the whole stimulus. These 
impressions usually include some subjective feelings: 
is string is grammatical 
, analytical strategy leads to the fact that the answers 
xplicit criteria are conscious and can be 
modified in learning by intentional hypotheses generation and testing. These processes take time, so such 
decisions are usually slower than while using the holistic strategy.  
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There are various conditions that affect the choice of strategy. They can be either internal or external. For 
example, the increase of sequential stimuli presentation speed force subject to use the intuitive strategy [8]. On 
the other hand, the requirement to justify their decisions provokes subject to use the analytical strategy [6]. In our 
study we create the situation of internal conflict in the implicit knowledge system, suggesting that it is critical for 
the mechanism controlling the interaction of consciousness and cognitive unconscious in learning. The results of 
the experiment prove the suggested view. It is important to emphasize that the switch of E2-subjects to the 
analytical strategy allowed them to demonstrate the similar efficiency level as in E1 group. We suppose that 
changing decision making criterion, E2-subjects actually stopped to rely on the implicit hint (lengthiness), which 
ceased to be relevant. 
This work is the first in a series of studies, which, in our opinion, can resolve some contradictions in the field 
of the implicit learning research. We are talking primarily about the discussion of the approaches that claim that 
implicit and explicit knowledge are either the result of work of two different cognitive blocks, or the result of 
application of different strategies. We suppose that decision making strategies can be viewed as different modes 
of interaction of two cognitive blocks. 
Acknowledgments 
The research was supported by grant from Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Grant  12-06-00311). 
References 
[1] Reber AS. Implicit learning and tacit knowledge: An essay on the cognitive unconscious. 1st ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press; 1993.  
[2] Cleeremans A, Destrebecqz A, Boyer M. Implicit learning: news from the front. Trends Cogn Sci. 
1998;2(10):587 90. 
[3] Mathews RC. The forgetting algorithm: How fragmentary knowledge of exemplars can abstract knowledge. J 
Exp Psychol Gen. 1991;120(1):117 9. 
[4] Lewicki P, Hill T, Sasaki I. Self-perpetuating development of encoding biases. J Exp Psychol Gen. 
1989;118(4):323 37. 
[5] Reber AS, Allen R. Analogic and abstraction strategies in synthetic grammar learning: A functionalist 
interpretation. Cognition. 1978;6(3):189 221. 
[6] Ponomarev JA. Psychology of creativity. 1st ed. Moscow: Nauka; 1976. (in Russian) 
[7] Lewicki P, Hill T, Czyzewska M. Hidden covariation detection: a fundamental and ubiquitous phenomenon. J 
Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 1997;23(1):221 8. 
[8] Whittlesea BW, Price JR. Implicit/explicit memory versus analytic/nonanalytic processing: rethinking the 
mere exposure effect. Mem Cognit. 2001;29(2):234 46. 
[9] Shanks DR, St. John M. Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems. Behav Brain Sci. 
1994;17(03):367 95. 
[10] Dienes Z, Berry D. Implicit learning: Below the subjective threshold. Psychon Bull Rev. 1997;4(1):3 23. 
[11] Dienes Z, Scott R. Measuring unconscious knowledge: distinguishing structural knowledge and judgment 
knowledge. Psychol Res. 2005;69(5-6):338 51. 
[12] Bierman DJ, Destrebecqz A, Cleeremans A. Intuitive decision making in complex situations: somatic 
markers in an artificial grammar learning task. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci. 2005;5(3):297 305. 
[13] Allakhverdov VM, Gershkovich VA. Does consciousness exist?--In what sense? Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 
2010;44(4):340 7. 
[14] Brooks LR, Vokey JR. Abstract analogies and abstracted grammars: Comments on Reber (1989) and 
Mathews et al. (1989). J Exp Psychol Gen. 1991;120(3):316 23. 
